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Traditionally, protective schemes in the laws of war are tightly coupled to 
rigid status categories.1 The contours of these status categories (and the content of 
corresponding protective schemes) reflect the dual normative commitments of this 
body of law: military necessity and humanitarianism. Formal protection varies 
along a number of axes (including combatant status, nationality, territory, and the 
character of the conflict) because it is thought that these factors roughly track the 
vulnerability of and the security challenges posed by specific status groups. In 
early law of war treaties, specific status categories are defined in terms that 
                                                        
† Visiting Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School; Associate Professor of 
Law. Designate, Arizona State University College of Law. Thanks to William Bradford, Adam 
Cox, Jack Goldsmith, Ryan Goodman, Harold Hongju Koh, Jordan Paust, Eric Posner, Kal 
Raustiala, Adrian Vermeule, and John Yoo for helpful comments. Thanks also to participants at 
faculty workshops at the University of Chicago Law School and Arizona State University College 
of Law.  
1 The “laws of war” encompass two distinct bodies of rules: the jus ad bellum—rules 
governing when uses of force are lawful; and the jus in bello—rules governing the conduct of war. 
“International humanitarian law” refers to the corpus of jus in bello (and perhaps some rules—
such as the prohibitions on “genocide” and “crimes against humanity”—formally outside the jus in 
bello. The jus in bello itself has two principal subdivisions: “Geneva law” and “Hague law.” 
Geneva law, embodied principally in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 
Additional Protocols, prescribes an extensive body of detailed rules governing the treatment of the 
victims of armed conflict. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Geneva Convention III or GPW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva 
Convention IV or GC]. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. Hague law, embodied 
principally in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, govern the means and methods of warfare, 
tactics and the general conduct of hostilities. See, e.g., Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (Hague 
Regulations are annexed to the Convention) [hereinafter Hague Regulations or Hague 
Convention].  
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encourage protection-seeking states (and at times individuals) to orient their 
behavior in ways that promote the objectives of humanitarian law. Protection, in 
these treaties, is a carrot for rule-regarding behavior—harsh, summary treatment 
at the hands of the enemy, the stick. Such an approach, by design, includes 
coverage gaps.  
 
Beginning with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, this understanding of status 
has been in decline. Over the last half century, protective schemes have converged 
and coverage gaps have closed. From the “human rights” perspective, these 
developments are all to the good. The “humanization of humanitarian law” 
reflects the progressive trajectory of international law in which universal human 
rights trump parochial state interests.2 From the “traditionalist” perspective, the 
law of war has lost its compass. Protection of unlawful combatants (1) 
undermines the humanitarian ambitions of the law of war by compromising the 
protection of innocent civilians; and (2) undermines political and institutional 
support for the law of war by imposing on states obligations that are inconsistent 
with various security imperatives. Both views are flawed. Protection should, 
contra the “human rights” view, accommodate the realities of the battlefield. On 
the other hand, humane treatment of the enemy, irrespective of pre-capture 
conduct, furthers the military objectives of the capturing state.  
 
My argument is that humanitarian protection in time of war should not 
vary by detainee status category—what I will call “protective parity.” The paper 
has a descriptive and a prescriptive dimension. Through an analysis of the legal 
situation of unlawful combatants, I illustrate that (1) protective schemes are 
converging; and (2) although the protective significance of POW status is 
declining, there are some persistent gaps in coverage.  
 
The unique protective significance of POW status (and the claims that 
justify this extra increment of protection) suggests that POWs are systematically 
over-protected (even if only to a modest extent) and unlawful combatants are 
systematically under-protected. To make this case, I offer a cluster of offensive 
claims and one defensive claim. On the offensive side, I argue that various claims 
for expanding or contracting humanitarian protection do not track status 
categories. In this way, the claims that undergird these ostensibly competing 
schools of thought support “protective parity.” Consider the following related 
points. If protective schemes compromise legitimate security interests (think of 
the policy arguments advanced by the United States to justify its treatment of the 
detainees in Cuba), then some status categories (e.g., POWs) are systematically 
                                                        
2 See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 96 AMER. J. INT’L L. 
(2000). 
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over-protected. That is, these security-based claims, if valid, would apply 
irrespective of whether the detainees were properly classified as POWs or not. If 
humane treatment of the enemy increases battlefield effectiveness (because poor 
treatment discourages surrender, encourages reprisals, decreases troop morale, 
and decreases political support for the war effort), then some status categories 
(e.g., unlawful combatants) are systematically under-protected.  
 
On the defensive side, I argue that “protective parity” is consistent with 
the principle of distinction. Even if “irregularization” undermines distinction, the 
question is how best to encourage fighters to distinguish themselves from the 
civilian population. I maintain that protective status categories are an inefficient 
way to incentivize individual combatants because these categories necessarily 
trade on collective considerations—such as the organizational characteristics of 
the fighting force. The rule of distinction would be better served by an 
individualized “war crimes” approach that accorded all fighters substantial 
humanitarian protection and punished (in accord with basic requirements of due 
process) individual bad actors.    
 
 
I. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF STATUS CATEGORIES IN THE LAW OF WAR 
 
Individual status categories have played an important role in the laws of 
war. The scope and content of protective schemes have traditionally turned on 
whether affected persons are properly classified as “combatants,” “non-
combatants,” “prisoners of war,” or “civilians.” Why this is so requires some 
explanation. The jus in bello governs the conduct of war (rather than the legality 
or legitimacy of the war itself); and is, in this sense, a second-best 
humanitarianism.  Its rules promote humanitarian values within a context most 
inhospitable to such values: large scale, organized hostilities. Given this 
limitation, the law of war seeks to define and eliminate “unnecessary” suffering 
(and devastation) in time of war. Three types of rules promote this objective: (1) 
rules governing who and what may be attacked; (2) rules governing the means 
and methods used in executing lawful attacks; and (3) rules governing the 
treatment of persons subject to the authority of the enemy (e.g., persons captured 
and detained in time of war).  Status categories play a central (though somewhat 
different) role all three regimes.  
 
Type-1 rules build on a distinction between military targets and civilian 
targets—only the former may be made the object of an attack.3 Therefore, persons 
                                                        
3 See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note ___, arts. 49-50; see also JUDITH GAIL GARDAM, 
NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1993). 
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properly classified as “civilians” enjoy “non-combatant immunity” from attack.4 
This is not to say that any attack resulting in the death of civilians is unlawful—
the law prohibits directing attacks against civilians as such.  
 
Type-2 rules, in part, build on the distinction between military and civilian 
targets—prohibiting means and methods that cause death and destruction 
disproportionate to the concrete military advantage issuing from the attack.5 Once 
again, the objectives of the law of war (and the interests it seeks to protect) 
require categorization of targets (including persons)—targets are assigned a status 
that determines the scope and content of protection accorded that potential target.  
 
Type-3 rules are similar in some respects but also importantly different. 
These rules, embodied principally in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 
protocols, protect persons no longer participating in the hostilities who have been 
made subject to the authority of the enemy.6 For example, the prisoner-of-war 
Convention protects persons captured and detained by the enemy.7 Given the 
scope of their application, these rules (as a conceptual matter) do not rely upon 
the distinction between “military” and “civilian.” Nevertheless, these rules do 
apportion humanitarian protection along rigid status categories. Each treaty 
defines, with some precision, the categories of persons protected by it. Why this is 
so is less clear. Protection is apportioned across status categories even though the 
distinctions between these categories do not directly serve the objectives of 
Geneva law. These status categories—most importantly, “prisoner of war” and 
“civilian”— are defined so as to incentivize various actors (collective and 
individual) to promote the overall policy objectives of the law of war. That is, 
protection is offered as a carrot to encourage rule-regarding and rule-promoting 
conduct at the organizational and individual level. The protection accorded by 
Type-3 rules (Geneva law) is extended as a carrot to induce behavior that 
promotes the objectives of Type-1 and Type-2 rules (Hague law). 
 
This point requires some clarification. Consider type-1 rules in more 
detail. The law of war requires that attacks be directed only against valid military 
targets. Therefore, no attack may be directed against civilians or civilian 
                                                        
4 See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note ___, arts. 49-50; see also GARDAM, supra note ___.. 
5 See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note ___, arts. 51-52; see also A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD 14-19 (1996). 
6 GPW, supra note [1], art. 4 (protecting specific categories of persons captured and 
detained by enemy forces); GC, supra note [1], art. 4 (protecting persons “who, at a given moment 
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of 
a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”); see also JEAN 
PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29-49 (1985). 
7 GPW, supra note [1], art. 4. 
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objects—even if doing so would serve the military interests of the attacking force. 
The law of war, in this sense, is predicated on the distinction between military and 
civilian objects. One important incidence of this general distinction is the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Under the law of war, only 
combatants may be made the object of an attack, so as to spare the latter, as much 
as possible, the ravages of war. Non-combatants are granted immunity from 
attack so long as they do not participate directly in the hostilities. In this sense, the 
protection of non-combatants from attack is predicated on a clear distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants. If attacking forces cannot distinguish 
between enemy soldiers and civilians, this type of rule cannot work well. If so-
called irregular fighters—those not part of the regular armed forces—are “lawful” 
combatants, then the distinction between soldier and civilian is blurred. It is the 
goal of protecting innocent civilians that requires a sharp line between combatants 
and non-combatants. The upshot is that “regularization” of armed forces is 
essential to the proper functioning of Hague law.  
 
Of course, it does not necessarily follow from this point that irregular 
fighters should be denied humanitarian protection upon capture. Indeed, there are 
at least two ways to understand the relationship between Hague law (Types-1 and 
-2 rules) and Geneva law (Type-3 rules). On the one hand, the regimes could be 
completely decoupled. That is, Geneva law need not have any structural 
relationship to Hague law. On this view, all persons captured in time of war are 
entitled to humanitarian protection irrespective of whether their war-time conduct 
transgressed the rule of distinction. I will call this view, the “human rights” view. 
Or, as previously described, Geneva law could be oriented in such a way as to 
induce regularization of armed forces. To do so, Geneva law would delimit the 
categories of individuals qualifying for protection. On this view, post-capture 
protections would extend to two groups: those who do not fight (non-combatants); 
and those who fight in forces that are sufficiently regularized (lawful combatants).  
 
“Irregulars”—the residual category of so-called unlawful combatants—
would enjoy no protection. The idea is to deter “irregularization” by threatening 
the denial of any rights-bearing status. In the Hague Conventions of 1907, the 
“rights and obligations” of war extended only to those combatants satisfying the 
four criteria of regularization: operate under a responsible command structure; 
wear a fixed, distinctive emblem visible at a distance; carry arms openly; and 
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war. The 1929 and 1949 
Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Prisoners of War, drawing on this 
tradition, defined the category of persons protected by it in roughly the same 
terms. This “traditionalist” perspective suggests that denial of POW status leaves 
Laws of War 
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captured combatants largely unprotected by humanitarian law.8 In one influential 
writer’s view, such persons were placed upon capture at the mercy of the 
detaining power.9  
                                                        
8 See U.S. Dep’t of War, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United 
States in the Field by Order of the Secretary of War, General Orders No. 100, art. LVII (1863); 
Capt. Michael W. Brough, The POW in a Time of Terrorism: An Investigation into Moral Status, 
in JSCOPE 2003: JOINT SERVICES CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2003), available at 
<http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE03/Brough03.html> (“Captured combatants who are not 
POWs are devoid of GC protection, and they are at the mercy of the Detaining Power.  The 
Detaining Power may agree to treat the captives as if they were POWs (as President Bush declared 
he would do for Afghan detainees), but they are not bound by international agreement to do so . . . 
.”); COLM MCKEOGH, INNOCENT CIVILIANS: THE MORALITY OF KILLING IN WAR 137 (2002) 
(“The formal approach to combatancy of the Hague Regulations yielded a clear delineation of the 
categories of combatant and civilian. However, this clear delineation also meant that there was a 
gap between the two lawful categories of combatant and civilian. There was a third category of 
person in war: the unlawful combatant. Those who did not abide by the rules set out in the [Hague 
Regulations defining lawful combatants] were unlawful combatants and were accorded no 
protection.”) (emphasis added); INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 148 (2nd ed. 2000) (“Unlawful 
combatants . . . though they are a legitimate target for any belligerent action, are not, if captured, 
entitled to any prisoner of war status. . . . They are often summarily tried and enjoy no protection 
under international law.”); G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of 
Guerilla Warfare, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS 206, 208 (Michael A. Meyer 
& Hilaire McCoubrey, eds. 1998) (“Civilians participating in combat ceased to be immune from 
attack. They might be killed in combat, and, on capture, were liable to be treated as marauders and 
executed summarily at the discretion of the captor commander. . . .[T]heir very participation, 
however conducted, was in itself a violation of the law of war, or, alternatively, conduct that put 
them outside its protection and left them at the mercy of the enemy.”); Richard R. Baxter, The 
Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (Law of the Hague), in INTERNATIONAL 
DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 93, 105-06 (1988) (arguing that unlawful combatants “upon 
capture were not entitled to be treated either as prisoners of war or as peaceful civilians;” and that 
they “fell outside the protected categories . . . .”); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, II INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT  
115-117 (1968) (arguing that unprivileged belligerents are in the same position as “spies,” and as 
such, entitled only to the “minimum requirements imposed by the standard of civilization”—
which he suggests includes the right to “a [standardless] trial”); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS 
ON INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 549 (1954) (maintaining that the distinction between 
unprivileged and privileged combatants “draws the line between those personnel who, on capture, 
are entitled under international law to certain minimal treatment as prisoners of war, and those not 
entitled to such protection. ‘Noncombatants’ who engaged in hostilities are one of the classes 
deprived of such protection . . . . Such unprivileged belligerents, though not condemned by 
international law, are not protected by it, but are left to the discretion of the belligerent threatened 
by their activities.”); II OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR, AND NEUTRALITY 
256 (H. Lauterpacht, ed. 1948) (arguing that unlawful combatants are “likely to be treated as war 
criminals, and shot.”); J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 37 (1911) (“[W]ar law has a short 
shrift for the non-combatant who violates its principles by taking up arms.”); id. at 35-72 
(outlining long history of summary treatment accorded unlawful combatants).  EMMERICH DE 
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 481 (Luke White, ed. 1792) (“A nation attacked by such sort of 
Laws of War 
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This is not to say that the 1949 Geneva Conventions (and certainly not the 
1977 protocols thereto) take this approach. Indeed, in my view, they do so only to 
a limited extent. As I demonstrate more fully in Part II, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions—though they draw on many structural features of traditional law of 
war treaties—lay the foundations for the “human rights” perspective that so 
clearly predominates in the 1977 protocols (and other important developments in 
humanitarian law). The Geneva Civilians Convention accords substantial 
protection, which tracks closely the protection accorded under the POW 
Convention, to all enemy nationals who have “fallen into the hands of the 
enemy.” Moreover, the Civilians Convention expressly applies to “unlawful 
combatants”—authorizing states in such cases to derogate, where necessary for 
security reasons, from certain rights recognized in the treaty. Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, and the 
procedural rights regime embedded in the Conventions’ grave breach regime 
provide important humanitarian protections to persons subject to the authority of 
the enemy—without regard to the “status” or pre-capture behavior of the 
individual in question.  
 
These developments, without question, have blunted the sharp edge of 
status determinations. Nevertheless, they have not eliminated the protective 
consequences of status in the law of war. Only prisoners of war are entitled to 
combatant immunity—the rule that lawful combatants may not be subject to 
criminal prosecution for their very participation in the hostilities; and only POWs 
enjoy so-called “assimilation rights”—the rule requiring that lawful combatants 
be accorded the same rights as members of the detaining state’s armed forces. In 
addition, the application of the Civilians Convention to unlawful combatants is 
conditioned by Article 5 which authorizes states to restrict detainee rights where 
necessary to protect state security. Finally, the gap-filling provisions—Common 
                                                                                                                                                       
enemies [unlawful combatants] is not under any obligation to observe towards them the rules of 
wars in form.”). 
9 Richard R. Baxter, So-Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerrillas, and 
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 321, 328 (1952). Baxter concluded: 
The correct legal formulation is, it is submitted, that armed and unarmed 
hostilities, wherever occurring, committed by persons other than those entitled 
to be treated as prisoners of war or peaceful civilians merely deprive such 
individuals of a protection they might otherwise enjoy under international law 
and place them virtually at the power of the enemy. . . . International law 
deliberately neglects to protect unprivileged belligerents because of the danger 
their acts present to their opponents. . . . [Privileged belligerents] have a 
protected status upon capture, whilst other belligerents not so identified do not 
benefit from any comprehensive scheme of protection. 
Id. at 343. 
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Article 3 and Article 75 of AP I—do not provide a comprehensive protective 
scheme. In short, coverage gaps have narrowed, but nevertheless persist.  
  
The question is how best to evaluate these developments. From the 
traditionalist perspective, they are counter-productive in that they erode the 
distinction between combatant and non-combatant by undermining the incentive 
structure of the law of war. From the human rights perspective, however, these 
developments represent a sensible compromise between humanitarian values and 
military necessity. As suggested in the Introduction, both views are unpersuasive. 
Note initially that both views calibrate treatment by combatant status category. 
Clearly this is so for the traditionalist view but it is also true for the human rights 
perspective. Contemporary Geneva law, even in its most progressive moments, 
does not contemplate “protective parity” across status categories.10 The primary 
reason for this is simple: graduated protective schemes, it is thought, promote 
humanitarian values by reinforcing the principle of distinction.  
 
In this Article, I reexamine the assumptions embedded in this bit of 
conventional wisdom. In doing so, I ask what work we might reasonably expect 
combatant status categories to do; and how best to design the protective regimes 
in view of these potential functions. My claim is that the traditional notion of 
POW status should carry no protective implications. In other words, I suggest that 
unlawful combatants should be protected to the same extent as POWs (lawful 
combatants). Developments in humanitarian law, military (and law enforcement) 
policy, and the nature of organized hostilities favor “protective parity” across all 
categories of war detainees. 
 
 
II. THE DECLINE OF STATUS: TOWARD PROTECTIVE PARITY  
 
 
 In this Part, I outline the aforementioned developments in Geneva law. My 
aim is to provide a brief overview of the concrete protective consequences that 
attach to combatant status determinations. Toward this end, I survey the rights of 
POWs and the rights of unlawful combatants—individuals who participate in the 
hostilities without satisfying the minimum legal requirements to do so. This 
survey supports two important propositions that will serve as the backdrop for my 
broader policy claim. First, Geneva law accord substantial legal protection to both 
lawful combatants (POWs) and unlawful combatants. Second, there are 
                                                        
10 Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Geneva law has moved in the direction of 
“protective parity.” I document in great detail the various developments in other work. See Derek 
Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2004). 
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nevertheless important discrepancies in the protective schemes applicable to these 
status categories.  
 
A. Protections Applicable to POWs 
 
Prisoners of war (POWs) enjoy substantial international legal protection pursuant 
to the Geneva Convention on POWs (GPW or POW Convention).11 These 
protections include: (1) the right to humane treatment (including important 
limitations on coercive interrogation tactics);12 (2) due process rights;13 (3) the 
right to release and repatriation upon the cessation of active hostilities;14 and (4) 
the right to communication with (and the institutionalized supervision of) 
protective agencies.15 The GPW also prohibits reprisals against POWs;16 and 
precludes the use of POWs as slave labor.17 In addition, POWs may not be 
prosecuted for their participation in the hostilitiesthat is, they are entitled to 
“combatant immunity.”18 Moreover, the GPW makes clear that POW rights are 
inalienable19 and non-derogable.20 Finally, the Convention requires that states 
suppress the mistreatment of POWs by investigating, prosecuting, and punishing 
                                                        
11 Geneva Convention III, supra note ____. 
12 Id. art. 13 (humane treatment); see also id. arts. 17-19 (rules concerning interrogation); 
id. arts. 21-48 (rules governing conditions of confinement). 
13 Id. arts. 99-108. 
14 Id. art. 117-118. 
15 Id. arts. 8-11.  
16 Id. art. 13. 
17 Id. arts. 49-57 . 
18 This privilege is, as a formal matter, extra-conventional in that the Geneva 
Conventions do not expressly accord any such privilege. It is nevertheless universally recognized. 
See, e.g., Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 205, 212 
(1977) (“[T]hose who are entitled to the juridical status of ‘privileged combatant’ are immune 
from criminal prosecution for those warlike acts which do not violate the laws and customs of war 
but which might otherwise be common crimes under municipal law.”)); Georg Schwarzenberger, 
Human Rights and Guerrilla Warfare, 1 IS. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 246, 246 (1971); Geoffrey S. Korn & 
Michael L. Schmidt, “To Be Or Not To Be, That Is The Question” Contemporary Military 
Operations and The Status of Captured Personnel, 1999 ARMY LAW. 1, 14 (1999) (arguing that 
combatants, as privileged belligerents, are entitled to “a blanket of immunity for their pre-capture 
warlike acts”); United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 757, 1228, 8 War Crimes Reports 
58 (1948). Moreover, the privilege may be inferred from several provisions of the GPW. See 
Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, arts. 82, 87-89.   
19  Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 7. 
20  Id. art. 5 (providing that the Convention “shall apply to the persons referred to in 
Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and 
repatriation.”). 
Laws of War 
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individuals responsible for violations of the Convention.21 Aggravated 
mistreatment of persons entitled to POW status constitutes a “grave breach” of 
international humanitarian law22—giving rise to individual criminal liability.23 
The criminalization of POW rules is now also recognized in many national penal 
codes24 and several important international agreements concerning the scope of 
international criminal law—including the International Criminal Court25 and the 
ad hoc U.N. criminal tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia.26 
 
B. Protections Applicable to Unlawful Combatants  
 
 I next outline the protective schemes governing the treatment of unlawful 
combatants in Geneva lawthat is, individuals who participate in hostilities 
without satisfying the requirements for POW status. Traditionally, international 
law did not protect unlawful combatants but, as I describe below, all captured 
combatants enjoy substantial protection (even if some important discrepancies 
persist). Whether this convergence in protective schemes is normatively attractive 
is addressed in Part III. 
 
1. Geneva Civilians Convention (the Fourth Geneva Convention) 
 
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons (GC or 
Civilians Convention) provides detailed rules governing the treatment of 
“civilians” in armed conflicts; and the substance of these rules mirrors in most 
important respects the rights of POWs. These protections include: due process 
                                                        
21  Id. arts. 129-131. 
22 See Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, arts. 129-131. 
23 Id.; see also JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2000) 
(describing the emergence of individual criminal responsibility in the laws of war). 
24 See, e.g., Int’l Comm. Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law, National 
Implementation Database, available at <http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/WebLAW2?OpenView> 
(providing excerpts of implementing national legislation from over 50 countries); Coalition for the 
Int’l Criminal Court, National Legislation Database, available at <http://www.cicc.org> (providing 
full text of national war crimes legislation from over 35 states). 
25 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 52d 
Sess., Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 8 (1998), reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
26 See U.N. S.C. Res. 808, annexed to Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Report by the Secretary-
General, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704, art. 2 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159 
[hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
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rights (including the right to fair trial in the event of criminal prosecution);27 the 
right to humane treatment;28 freedom from coercive interrogation;29 freedom from 
discrimination;30 the right to repatriation (including the right to leave enemy 
territory voluntarily);31 the right to internal camp governance;32 and the 
prohibition on attacks directed against civilian objects (including strict prohibition 
of attacks on hospitals and other facilities providing essential services to the 
civilian population).33  
 
The Civilians Convention applies to all enemy nationalsincluding 
“unlawful” combatantsnot protected by the other Conventions.34 Although this 
point is often overlooked in current debates,35 it enjoys broad support in the legal 
literature,36 contemporary international war crimes jurisprudence,37 and national 
military manuals.38 Moreover, the text of the Civilians Convention suggests that it 
                                                        
27 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, art. 64-76, 126, 146-47. 
28 Id. arts. 27-34. 
29 Id. arts. 31-32. 
30 Id. arts. 1, 3, 27. 
31 Id. arts. 35-38, 77, 132-135. 
32 Id. arts. 101-104. 
33 Id. arts. 13-26. 
34 As I develop more fully below, Common Article 3, the provisions of Part II, and the 
penal repression regime are applicable irrespective of the nationality of the person in question. See 
Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, arts. 3, 13-26, 145-147. 
35 See, e.g., Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in The HANDBOOK OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 65, 67-68 (Deiter Fleck ed. 1995); Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/-V/II.116 
Doc. 5 rev. 1 corr., 22 October 2002, available at 
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm>. 
36 See, e.g., HILLARE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: MODERN 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LIMITATION OF WARFARE, 137 (2nd ed. 1998); MICHAEL BOTHE, ET AL., 
NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS 
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, 261-63 (1982); George Aldrich, The 
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the determination of illegal combatants, 96 AMER. J. INT’L L. 893 (2002); 
G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerrilla Warfare, BRITISH Y.B. 
INT’L L. 197 (1971); Frits Kalshoven, The Position of Guerrilla Fighters under the Law of War, 11 
REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 55, 71 (1972); Esbjorn Rosenblad, 
Guerrilla Warfare and International Law, 12 REVUE DE DROIT PÉNAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE 
LA GUERRE 91, 98 (1973); Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged 
Combatants”, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 849 (2003). 
37 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., ICTY (Judgment), IT-96-21-T, 16 November 
1998, para. 271 (“If an individual is not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a 
prisoner of war (or of the First or Second Conventions) he or she necessarily falls within the ambit 
of Convention IV, provided that its article 4 requirements are satisfied.”). 
38 See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: 
THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 31 (1956) (United States) (“If a person is determined by a 
competent tribunal, acting in conformity with Article 5 [GC III] not to fall within any of the 
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applies to unlawful combatants. Persons protected by the Convention are “those 
who, at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves . . . in 
the hands of a Party . . . of which they are not nationals.”39 The provision defining 
“protected persons” also makes clear that several categories of persons are not 
protected by the Convention. For example, nationals of a state “not bound by the 
Convention are not protected by it.”40 In addition, nationals of “neutral” or “co-
belligerent” states are not protected by the Convention “while the State of which 
they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose 
hands they are.”41 And, as previously discussed, the Civilians Convention does 
not apply to persons protected by any of the other Conventions.42 The provision 
does not, however, expressly limit the application of the Convention to persons 
taking no part in the hostilities.43 Indeed, the Convention prescribes, in some 
detail, rules governing the treatment of civilians “suspected of or engaged in 
activities hostile to the State.”44 It is also important to note that the definitions of 
“protected persons” in the other Geneva Conventions are, without exception, quite 
detailed.45 When read in light of the other Conventions, the Civilians Convention 
should not be interpreted as implicitly excluding from its protection a broad 
category of individuals otherwise satisfying its definition of “protected persons.”  
 
 Application of the Civilians Convention to unlawful combatants, however, 
is qualified by Article 5—the so-called “derogation” provision. The provision 
authorizes states, subject to important limitations, to deny protections to 
individuals “suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the 
State [or the Occupying Power].”46 In full, it provides that: 
 
Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is 
satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected 
of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such 
individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and 
privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in 
                                                                                                                                                       
categories listed in Article 4 [GC III], he is not entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. He is, 
however, a “protected person” within the meaning of Article 4 [GC IV].”); BRITISH MILITARY 
MANUAL, PART III: LAW OF LAND WARFARE 96 (1958) (United Kingdom). 
39 Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, art. 4. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. art. 5. 
45 See Geneva Convention I, supra note ___, art. 4; Geneva Convention II, supra note 
___, art. 4; Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 4 
46  Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, art. 5. 
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the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security 
of such State. 
 
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is 
detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite 
suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying 
Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military 
security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of 
communication under the present Convention.  
 
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with 
humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of 
fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They 
shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected 
person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent 
with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may 
be.47 
 
 To summarize, the Civilians Convention protects unlawful combatants; 
and these protections (when applicable in full) closely resemble the rights 
accorded under the POW Convention. Of course, these protections are subject to 
derogation if necessary for state security. Three important discrepancies between 
POW and Civilian protections must be registered.  
 
First, the rights of civilians taking part in hostilities—unlawful combatants—
are subject to derogation in some circumstances: POW rights are not. Second, 
POWs are assimilated, for protective purposes, into the armed forces of the 
detaining state. As such, they are entitled to trial before the same courts, and 
according to the same procedure as members of the regular armed forces of the 
detaining state. Civilians enjoy no such protection. Third, POWs are entitled to 
combatant immunity—that is, they may not be punished for their very 
participation in the hostilities. Civilians who take up arms may be subject to 
criminal prosecution simply for having done so. 
 
C. Supplementary Protections 
 
Several other aspects of Geneva law confer some protection on unlawful 
combatants. These protective schemes are far less detailed than the Civilians 
Convention, nevertheless, because these regimes are broadly applicable, they 
illustrate the degree of convergence across status categories. 
                                                        
47  Id. 
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1. Penal Repression Regime of the Geneva Conventions 
 
The Geneva Conventions also protect all unlawful combatants facing trial for 
war crimes. Indeed, the Conventions prescribe a detailed inventory of procedural 
rights guarantees for prosecutions brought under its substantive provisions. That 
is, the Conventions provide for minimum procedural rights for any person 
charged with serious violations of its substantive rules irrespective of the person’s 
status under the Conventions.48 Any person prosecuted for violations of the 
Geneva Conventions, irrespective of their status as “protected persons,” must be 
provided with “safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less 
favorable than” those outlined in Articles 105 and following of the Third Geneva 
Convention (concerning POWs).49 Article 105 specifically provides for basic fair 
trial rights including: the right to counsel of the defendant’s choice, the right to 
confer privately with counsel, the right to call witnesses, and the right to an 
interpreter.50 These provisions also require, for example, that accused persons be 
granted the same right of appeal as that open to members of the armed forces of 
the Detaining Power.51  
 
2. Common Article 3 
 
 The Geneva Conventions also specify fundamental humanitarian 
protections applicable to all persons subject to the authority of a party to the 
conflict. That is, the Conventions detail minimum protections to be accorded all 
persons no longer taking part in hostilities irrespective of: (1) the territory in 
which the affected person is located; (2) the nationality of the affected person; or 
(3) the character of the armed conflict. These principles, first codified in Common 
Article 3 of the Conventions, govern the treatment of persons no longer taking 
active part in the hostilities.52 All such persons are entitled to humane treatment 
and, in the case of criminal charges, fair trial by “a regularly constituted court, 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by 
civilized peoples.”53  It is also important to note that this provision is, by its 
                                                        
48  See, e.g., Geneva Conventions IV, supra note ___, art. 146. 
49  Geneva Convention I, supra note ___, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note ___, 
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, 
art. 146. 
50  Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 105. 
51  Id. art. 106. 
52  It is important to note that the provision expressly covers persons who take up arms 
against the state and applies even to persons who do not lay down their arms voluntarily. See 
Geneva Conventions, supra note ___, art. 3. 
53  Geneva Conventions, supra note ___, art. 3. 
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nature, applicable to “unlawful combatants” in that it governs the relations 
between states and informal armed opposition groups. The provision obligates 
states to apply, at a minimum, the following principles in armed conflicts “not of 
an international character”:  
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those 
placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, or any 
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, 
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or 
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end, 
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and 
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned 
persons:  
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;  
(b) taking of hostages;  
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment;  
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions 
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted 
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.  
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.54 
 
Of course, Common Article 3, by its terms, applies only to armed conflicts 
“not of an international character.”55 The structure and history of the Conventions, 
however, make clear that the provision applies in all armed conflicts. Utilizing 
language originally proposed as text for the preamble to the four Conventions, the 
drafters the provision sought to invoke the core principles of the treaty--those 
principles that should apply even in the absence of an international armed 
conflict; those principles that would pierce the veil of sovereignty. Indeed, the 
character of Common Article 3 was well understood by the drafters of the 
Conventions as evidenced by the ICRC Commentary: 
  
This minimum requirement in the case of a non-international 
armed conflict, is a fortiori applicable in international conflicts. It 
proclaims the guiding principle common to all four Geneva 
                                                        
54 Geneva Conventions, supra note ___, art. 3. 
55  Id. 
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Conventions, and from it each of them derives the essential 
provision around which it is built.”56  
 
The purpose of Common Article 3 was, therefore, to “ensur(e) respect for the 
few essential rules of humanity which all civilised nations consider as valid 
everywhere and under all circumstances and as being above and outside war 
itself.”57 In short, “[i]t is both legally and morally untenable that the rules 
contained in common Article 3, which constitute mandatory minimum rules 
applicable to internal conflicts, in which rules are less developed than in respect 
of international conflicts, would not be applicable to conflicts of an international 
character.”58 Indeed, the applicability of Common Article 3 to international armed 
conflicts is now recognized in the jurisprudence of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ),59 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY),60 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),61 and the Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights.62 It is U.S. military policy to apply 
Common Article 3 in all armed conflicts (and even in situations not rising to the 
level of an “armed conflict” such as internal disturbances).63 The Judge Advocate 
General of the U.S. Army endorses this view as well.64 Moreover, Additional 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, now ratified by over 160 countries, 
clarifies that the protections codified in Common Article 3 apply, as a matter of 
positive international law, to all armed conflicts.65 This avalanche of legal 
authority prompted the ICTY Appeals Chamber to proclaim that: “It is [now] 
indisputable that common Article 3, which sets forth a minimum core of 
                                                        
56 ICRC COMMENTARY IV, supra note ____, AT 14. 
57  Id. at 44. 
58  Prosecutor v. Celebici, ICTY Appeals Chamber, (2001) at para. 150. 
59 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at para. 
218. 
60 See Prosecutor v. Tadic (a/k/a “Dule”), Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 87 (Decision on 
the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Former 
Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber   [hereinafter Tadic Appeal], reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996). 
61 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Judgment) (Int’l Crim. Trib. For 
Rwanda Trial Chamber Sep. 2, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1399 (1998). 
62 See Abella Case, Inter-American Comm. on Human Rights, Report No. 55/97, Case 
No. 11.137, November 18, 1997, at paras. 155-156. 
63 See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM (Dec. 9, 1998). 
The directive states, in part: “The heads of the DOD Components shall: Ensure that the members 
of their Components comply with the law of war during all conflicts, however such conflicts are 
characterized, and with the principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.” Id. 
paras. 5.1, 5.3. See also Timothy P. Bulman, United States Law of War Obligations in Military 
Operations Other than War, 159 MIL. L. REV. 152 (1999). 
64 See U.S. Army, Judge Advocate General, Protection of Civilians During Armed 
Conflict, in OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 8-9 (2003). 
65  AP I, supra note ___, art. 75. 
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mandatory rules, reflects the fundamental humanitarian principles which underlie 
international humanitarian law as a whole, and upon which the Geneva 
Conventions in their entirety are based.”66  
 
3. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I 
 
 
Building on the protective schemes identified above, Article 75 of AP I 
and Article 6 of AP II clearly establish minimum humanitarian protections 
applicable to all persons “in the power of” a belligerent state—irrespective of 
whether any such person participated in the hostilities. Widely understood as the 
“gap filler” in Geneva law,67 the “fundamental guarantees” provisions of the 1977 
Protocols make clear that all persons subject to the authority of a belligerent are 
entitled to humanitarian protection. As discussed previously, the drafting history 
of Article 75 suggests that the provision was designed: (1) to clarify the scope and 
application of several fundamental guarantees recognized in the 1949 
Conventions; (2) to extend greater protections to persons not covered by those 
Conventions—most notably, nationals of the detaining power, nationals of co-
belligerents and neutrals, and stateless persons and refugees; and, by implication, 
(3) to condition the derogation powers conferred on states by Article 5 of the 
Civilians Convention by rendering a broader range of rights expressly non-
derogable.68  
 
Two points regarding the scope and content of Article 75 are relevant for 
present purposes. First, the text, structure, and drafting history of AP I make plain 
that it covers unlawful combatants. Second, Article 75 provides substantial 
protection—particularly to persons detained, arrested, or interned and persons 
facing criminal charges. As mentioned previously and discussed more fully 
below, the substance of this provision is clearly modeled on and, as a 
consequence, closely resembles that of Common Article 3. The most important 
advances relate to criminal procedure rights. In this regard, the provision reads:  
 
No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a 
person found guilty of a penal offense related to the armed conflict 
except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and 
                                                        
66  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic (Celebici Camp case), Appeals Chamber, 2001, at 
para. 143. 
67 See U.S. Army, Judge Advocate General, Protection of Civilians During Armed 
Conflict, in OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 9 (2003). 
68 BOTHE, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note ___, at 460-61. 
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regularly constituted court respecting the generally principles of 
regular judicial procedures . . . . 69 
 
Unlike Common Article 3, Article 75 of AP I specifies many of these principles. 
They include: (1) provision of “all necessary rights and means of defence” (which 
almost certainly includes the right to counsel, the right to be present at the 
hearing, the right to compel process, the right to be informed of pending charges, 
the right to be accorded sufficient time and resources to formulate a defense, and 
the right to challenge alleged unfairness in the proceedings on appeal); (2) the 
right to be presumed innocent; (3) freedom from compelled self-incrimination; (4) 
the right to be advised of rights and available post-conviction remedies; (5) 
freedom from ex post facto application of the criminal law; and (6) recognition of 
the principle of non bis in idem.70     
 
D. Persistent Gaps and Deficiencies in Geneva Law 
 
 Geneva law provides substantial legal protection to all war detainees 
including unlawful combatants. All persons detained by the enemy are entitled to 
the minimum protections of Common Article 3 and Article 75 of AP I. And, in 
virtue of Articles 4 and 5 of the Civilians Convention, all enemy aliens are 
“protected persons” under the Conventions; and are entitled, at a minimum, to 
humane treatment and fair trial rights. This provision also makes clear that 
“unlawful combatants” are presumptively covered by the full protections of the 
Civilians Conventions—even if some of these protections can be suspended if 
(and so long as) necessary to protect state security. Moreover, all persons accused 
of “war crimes” are entitled to due process rights that mirror in most important 
respects the rights accorded POWs.  
 
Does the denial of POW status carry any significant humanitarian 
consequences? Although the analysis to this point strongly suggests there are no 
such consequences, each alternative protective scheme is arguably deficient in 
important respects. Of course, the Civilians Convention writ large accords 
protection that in most important respects mirrors that of the POW Convention. 
And although the Civilians Convention protects unlawful combatants, its field of 
application is limited to enemy nationals (who must also be nationals of a state 
party to the Convention). In addition, the derogation regime of Article 5 
empowers states to deny some unlawful combatants certain rights recognized in 
the Convention if necessary to protect national security.  
 
                                                        
69 AP I, supra note ___, art. 75. 
70 Id. 
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The other alternative protective schemes also exhibit potentially 
significant deficiencies. Common Article 3 protects all combatants no longer 
taking active part in hostilities, but the substantive rules of the provision are cast 
in abstract terms the precise contours of which are unclear. In addition, the 
provision does not expressly include a right to release and repatriation at the close 
of hostilities. Moreover, no express provision is made in the Conventions for the 
enforcement of Common Article 3.71 Recall that the persons protected by 
Common Article 3 are not, as a formal matter, “protected persons” within the 
meaning of the Conventions.72 As a consequence, violations of Common Article 3 
do not constitute “grave breaches” of the Conventions; and, at the time the 
Conventions were drafted, it was unclear whether violations of Common Article 3 
gave rise to individual criminal liability at all.73 Article 75 of AP I gives rise to 
similar concerns. Although it protects all persons “in the power of” a belligerent 
state (and its substantive requirements are much more specific than Common 
Article 3), AP I does not prescribe an enforcement mechanism for this provision. 
That is, violations of Article 75, like those of Common Article 3, are not “grave 
breaches” of the Conventions; and it is unclear whether they give rise to 
individual criminal liability.74 Moreover, the legal status of AP I in many conflicts 
is itself somewhat ambiguous. The problem is that many states of geo-strategic 
significance have not ratified AP I including France, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Pakistan, and the United States.75 As a consequence, its legal status for these 
states is unclear. Finally, the penal repression regime of the Conventions protects 
all persons subject to prosecution for violations of the laws of war but these 
protections include only fair trial rightsfailing to establish any protection 
outside this context.  
 
In short, although Geneva law accords unlawful combatants substantial 
protection, some gaps in the coverage of these protective schemes persist. The 
current regime approximates, but falls short of, protective parity. In Part III, I 
assess the propriety of this regime (and its trajectory) through a sustained policy 
defense of protective parity. 
 
                                                        
71 See supra note ___ (discussing this issue). 
72 See supra note ___ (noting the consensus view; and evaluating U.S. claim to the 
contrary). 
73 See, e.g., MOIR, supra note ___; Jinks, supra note ___. 
74 BOTHE, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note ___, at ___; 
ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note ___, at ___. 
75 See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and 
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions, at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/party_gc (last visited June 22, 2003). 
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III. THE CASE FOR PROTECTIVE PARITY 
 
 
The unique protective significance of POW status (and the claims that justify 
this extra increment of protection) suggests that POWs are systematically over-
protected (even if only to a modest extent) and unlawful combatants are 
systematically under-protected. I conclude that the best regime would subject all 
captured combatants to a uniform protective scheme. In this Part, I offer a 
conceptual and normative defense of “protective parity”—suggesting that, under 
current law, POWs are systematically over-protected and unlawful combatants are 
systematically under-protected. In making the case for protective parity, I evaluate 
the strengths (and potential weaknesses) of this approach. I also analyze whether 
protective parity can be reconciled with a strong commitment to the principle of 
distinction. 
 
In Section A, I argue that the reasons for treating POWs fairly and 
humanely are equally applicable to unlawful combatants. That is, the policy 
claims favoring humane treatment are not tethered to the organizational 
characteristics that define POW status. In Section B, I argue that the security-
based rationales for denying protections to unlawful combatants are equally 
applicable to POWs. Once again, policy claims are not linked to general 
organizational features of the fighting force in question.  
 
Finally, in Section C, I reject the claim that some treatment differential is 
appropriate to enforce the principle of distinction. Even if “irregularization” 
undermines distinction, the question is how best to encourage fighters to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. I maintain that protective 
status categories are an inefficient way to incentivize combatants because these 
categories necessarily trade on collective considerations—such as the 
organizational characteristics of the fighting force. The rule of distinction would 
be better served, I submit, by an individualized “war crimes” approach that: 
accords all fighters substantial humanitarian protection; and punishes bad actors 
for failing to take adequate precautions under the circumstances. 
 
 
A. Why Protect POWs? 
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As described in Part II, POWs enjoy substantial protection in Geneva law. 
Two kinds of claims justify this protection: (1) humanitarian; and (2) strategic. 
First, the core principles of humanitarian law provide one important rationale. All 
captured fighters are “victims of war” and, as human beings, are entitled to 
humane treatment.76 Geneva law purports to protect only those combatants who 
have been rendered hors de combat—that is, combatants who, for whatever 
reason, are no longer taking part in the hostilities. In other words, the “status” of 
captured fighters lies somewhere between “combatants” proper and “non-
combatants.” They are detainees at the mercy of the detaining authority. In the 
absence of some compelling reason to deny protection, Geneva rules should 
accord humanitarian protection to such persons.77 The point here is that this kind 
of rationale proves too much—suggesting that all captured combatants should be 
accorded, as a presumptive matter, humane treatment. The foundation of this type 
of rationale is, in the end, the notion that certain entitlements issue from the very 
“human-ness” of the individual. Clearly, this type of claim does not track the 
definitional attributes of POW status—this type of claim would justify treating 
unlawful combatants humanely as well. 
Second, there are compelling strategic reasons to treat the enemy well. 
The general consensus is that observance of these rules is, in most circumstances, 
in the interest of opposing forces. Indeed, there is a substantial, interdisciplinary 
literature documenting the strategic benefits of treating enemy POWs well.78 
Harsh treatment of the enemy over-deters surrender—encouraging enemy forces 
to fight to the death.79 Some evidence also suggests that poor treatment of the 
                                                        
76 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1974) (outlining and offering an 
extended defense of this line of thought). 
77 One such countervailing consideration is the structural claim that characterizes the traditionalist 
perspective. As discussed at length in the Introduction and Part I, the idea here is that fair 
treatment might be offered as a carrot to induce fighters to observe the law of war. In other words, 
the calibration of fair and humane treatment serves a crucial structural function in humanitarian 
law. I evaluate this claim below. Note for the moment, however, that this kind of point does not 
demonstrate that unlawful combatants are not entitled to humane treatment. The logic of this claim 
suggests only that the humanitarian ambitions of the law of war require the calibration of humane 
treatment accorded captured combatants. 
78 See, e.g., DAN REITER & ALLAN C. STAM, DEMOCRACIES AT WAR 58-83 (2002); James D. 
Morrow, The Institutional Features of Prisoner of War Treaties, 55 INT’L ORG. __ (2001) 
(summarizing this research). 
79 See, e.g, REITER & STAM, supra note ___, at 67 (noting that “it is in the interest of all states to 
treat POWs well in order to seduce the enemy to surrender.”) (emphasis in original); Morrow, 
supra note ___, at 976 (“Rumors about how POWs are treated spread rapidly within armies and 
affect soldiers’ willingness to surrender. When POWs are reportedly treated poorly by a state, the 
opposing side’s soldiers are less likely to surrender, perferring to fight on even in unfavorable 
situations.”). 
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enemy undermines the morale of the capturing state’s forces.80 Other studies 
suggest that humane treatment of the enemy improves the ability of states to raise 
professional armies.81  And, so long as it is consistent with the efficient pursuit of 
military objectives, humane treatment minimizes various audience costs 
associated with waging modern wars: it is easier to build and sustain support for 
the war effort at home; and it is easier to build and sustain international 
operational (war-fighting) coalitions. In fact, Dan Reiter and Alan Stam utilize an 
extensive regression model (relying on an important, relatively-new data set) to 
make the case that humane treatment of POWs is correlated with battlefield 
effectiveness.82 These claims, considered in isolation, are unspectacular—indeed, 
the strategic benefits of treating POWs well have long been understood. The 
important point for our purposes is that these studies—whether they involve 
social psychological models of soldiers, interview data from combatants, 
comparative surrender and defection rates, or polling data—do not track the 
behavioral and organizational prerequisites of POW status. That is, these studies 
(and the claims that derive from them) document the importance of treating 
members of the opposing armed forces well—without regard to whether such 
persons satisfy the requirements for POW status. This cluster of claims also 
proves too much—the reasons for treating POWs well apply, in general, to 
unlawful combatants.  
B. Why deny Unlawful Combatants (Certain) Protections? 
Nevertheless, there may be good reasons to deny unlawful combatants 
some (or all) the protections accorded POWs. In Parts II and III, I demonstrated 
(1) that Geneva law protects unlawful combatants—persons taking direct part in 
hostilities without satisfying the requirements for POW status; and (2) that these 
protections approximate those accorded POWs. This Section in essence assesses 
the following hypothesis: the current regime—substantial protection with some 
important differentials—strikes the proper balance between humanitarianism and 
military necessity.  
Consider again the case of the detainees in Cuba. Recall that the official 
U.S. government position is that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda fighters qualify as 
POWs because they failed to satisfy international standards defining lawful 
combatants.83 In short, the United States maintains that assignment of POW status 
                                                        
80 See, e.g., REITER & STAM, supra note ___, at 69. 
81 See, e.g., Morrow, supra note ___, at 980-81. 
82 REITER & STAM, supra note ___, at 58-83. 
83  See Press Conference, Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld and General 
Myers, Feb. 8, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2002; Fact Sheet, White 
House Press Office, Feb. 7, 2002, available at 
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in this case would be incorrect as a matter of law and imprudent as a matter of 
policy. A brief summary of the policy arguments is useful for present purposes. 
Specifically, the U.S. argues that neither group of captured fighters satisfies the 
express requirements of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Prisoners of 
War (GPW); and that POW protections would impede the investigation and 
prosecution of suspected terrorists. Of particular concern on the policy front are 
(1) restrictions on the interrogation of POWs;84 (2) the criminal procedure rights 
of POWs (which might preclude trial by special “military commission”);85 (3) the 
right of POWs to release and repatriation following the cessation of hostilities;86 
and (4) possible claims of “combatant immunity” that might shield individuals 
from prosecution for acts of terrorism. The U.S. position is that these rights are 
inconsistent with various security imperatives. On the strength of these claims 
(and the merits of its classification determination), the U.S. concluded that the 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html [hereinafter U.S. Policy on 
Guantanamo Detainees]. For a summary of the government’s position, see Mike Allen and John 
Mintz, Bush Makes Decision on Detainees, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1; Murphy, supra note 
___. 
84 Under the GPW, the detaining authority may not subject POWs to coercive 
questioning; and POWs are required only to provide name, rank, and serial number to 
interrogators. See Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, arts. 17-18; Rabkin, supra note ___ 
(defending denial of POW status to Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees, in part, on this ground); 
Wedgwood, supra note ___ (same).  
85  See MILITARY ORDER, NOVEMBER 13, 2001 DETENTION, TREATMENT, AND TRIAL OF 
CERTAIN NON-CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM §1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 
2001) [hereinafter MILITARY ORDER]. It is a fair reading of the GPW that POWs facing criminal 
charges are entitled to trial by court-martial or regular civil court. See Geneva Convention III, 
supra note ___, arts. 99, 102; Neal Kumar Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding 
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1263-66 (2002) (concluding, in view of 
rights recognized in the GPW, that the Military Order must cover only unlawful belligerents); 
Laura Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, 
International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1423-24 2002); Daryl A. 
Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96 
AM. J. INT’L L. 320, 324-26 (2002); Diane F. Orenlichter & Robert Kogod Goldman, When 
Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 653, 659-63 (2002); Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 
23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Paust, Courting Illegality]. Under this view, denying 
POW status would appear to leave open the possibility of trying detainees before military 
commissions for violations of the law of war. See supra note ___. 
86 See Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, arts. 117-118 (recognizing the right to 
repatriation); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on 
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 353 (2002) (suggesting that this right is one procedural 
consequence of denying POW status); Rabkin, supra note ___ (defending denial of POW status to 
Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees, in part, on this ground); Wedgwood, supra note ___ (same).   
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detainees are “unlawful combatants” (or “unprivileged belligerents”) not 
protected by the Geneva Conventions.87  
 
I want to make two points general points; then say a bit more about a 
couple of these issues. First, some of these rights are not unique to POW status. 
Specifically, the Civilians Convention recognizes interrogation rights and the 
right to release and repatriation are accorded several categories of detainees—
indeed, the language of the two treaties is identical. Moreover, several 
commentators and some military manuals infer these rights from Common Article 
3 and Article 75 of AP I. Second, these security-based claims, if correct, prove too 
much. These security-based claims would apply irrespective of whether the 
detainees were properly classified as POWs or not. That is, if these protective 
schemes compromise legitimate security interests, then POWs are systematically 
over-protected.  
To analyze whether the prevailing scheme over-protects unlawful 
combatants, it is important to examine more closely the unique protective 
consequences of POW status. Two potentially important protections highlighted 
by the U.S. position merit more extended consideration. First, the POW 
Convention prohibits trial of POWs by special military courts (such as military 
commissions).88 The Convention provides that POWs “can be validly sentenced 
only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the 
same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining 
Power . . . .”89 There is no analogue in the Civilians Convention. Second, POWs 
enjoy a broad “combatant immunity” that precludes punishing them for their very 
participation in the hostilities.90 Civilians enjoy no such immunity. Although these 
claims also prove too much (in that the logic that undergirds them would also 
apply to POWs), I have a bit more to say about each.  
 
1. Assimilation Rights and Ad Hoc “Military Commissions” 
                                                        
87 In addition, the U.S. government asserts that the Geneva Conventions do not, in any 
case, apply to al Qaeda fightersbecause that group is a non-governmental, criminal organization 
not party to the treaties. See U.S. Policy on Guantanamo Detainees, supra note ___, at 1 (“Al-
Qaida is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its 
members are not entitled to POW status.”).  
88 See, e.g., Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note ___; Katyal & Tribe, supra note ___; 
Drumbl, supra note ___. 
89 Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 102. 
90 See supra text accompanying notes ___ (explaining concept and collecting citations). 
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One potentially important consequence of POW status is that it precludes 
the use of specialized, ad hoc criminal proceedings (such as the contemplated 
military commissions). This point enjoys a surface plausibility in that the POW 
Convention requires that POWs be tried by the same courts in which the armed 
forces of the detaining power would be tried.91 POWs held by the United States, 
for example, must be tried in U.S. courts-martial. This rule, for which there is no 
direct analogue in the Civilians Convention, seemingly suggests that military 
commissions are a viable prosecutorial option only if the detainees are not POWs.  
 
This claim, however, requires some qualification. As described in detail in 
Part III, unlawful combatants enjoy general criminal procedure rights that mirror 
the protections accorded POWs. If the policy value of military commissions 
derives from their summary procedures, then the protections afforded unlawful 
combatants would deprive the commissions of their value in any case. That is, the 
rights of unlawful combatants would require procedural guarantees identical to 
those of courts-martial. In addition, the Geneva Conventions arguably prohibit 
irregular “military commissions” irrespective of the procedural rights guaranteed 
in such proceedings. Recall that all persons facing criminal punishment are 
entitled to trial by “regular” courts.92 The Moreover, it is important to point out 
that this POW “right” to trial by regular military court is, in many instances, a 
disability. That is, trial procedures utilized by military courts often fall short of 
international due process standards.93 When evaluated along this axis, the military 
commission procedures arguably fail to satisfy in several respects the minimum 
requirements of Geneva law. For example, the commissions themselves arguably 
do not constitute impartial, independent tribunals.94 The commissions arguably do 
not qualify as “tribunals established by law,” and they clearly are not “regularly 
constituted courts.”95 In addition, the Department of Defense procedures arguably 
                                                        
91 See Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 82. 
92 See Geneva Conventions, supra note ___, common art. 3; AP I, supra note ___, art. 75.  
93 See, e.g., U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Issue of the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals, 9 July 2002, Doc. No. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4 (Report of Louis Jonet) (summarizing poor human rights record of military 
courts).    
94  See, e.g., LAWYER’S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER: 
A GUIDE TO THE FINAL RULES FOR THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 5 (2003) [hereinafter LCHR, 
TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER] (arguing that the military commission scheme is “particularly 
susceptible to abuse because the entire process is limited to one branch of government (the 
executive) with no meaningful independent oversight or review by either the judiciary or the 
legislature, and none of the participants has both standing and an interest to challenge possible 
abuses.”). 
95  See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules 
of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 677, 687-90 (2002) [hereinafter Paust, Ad Hoc DoD Rules]. 
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deprive defendants of any meaningful right to counsel.96 They also limit the 
defendant’s ability to mount an effective defense by sharply qualifying the right to 
confront witnesses and compel process.97 Finally, the procedures do not recognize 
a right to appeal to a higher tribunal.98 
 
2. Combatant Immunity 
Another potentially significant protective consequence of POW status is 
combatant immunity. Indeed, comparison of the schemes analyzed in Parts II and 
III makes clear that the real purchase of POW status is combatant immunity and 
not the procedural rights protections attaching to the designation. That is, the most 
significant consequence of POW status is that lawful combatants cannot be 
punished for their otherwise lawful participation in the hostilities. This point of 
law, although firmly-established, requires some qualification.  
Although POWs are entitled to engage in combat, they must comply with 
the laws of war.99 Accordingly, a POW may be prosecuted for pre-capture 
                                                        
96  One problematic aspect of the rules is that civilian counsel (the counsel chosen by the 
accused) can be excluded from “closed Commission proceedings” and denied “access to any 
information protected under [the procedure’s security exclusion].” Dep’t of Defense, Military 
Comm’n Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) §§ 4(C)(3), 6(B)(3), 6(D)(5) [hereinafter DOD Order], 
available at http:// www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf; see also Paust, Ad 
Hoc DoD Rules, supra note __, at 690. 
97  The procedures drastically curtail the right of confrontation. Cross-examination of 
witnesses against the accused is authorized only with respect to witnesses “who appear before the 
Commission.” DoD Order, supra note 21, § 5(I). Witnesses can also provide testimony “by 
telephone, audiovisual means, or other means,” by “introduction of prepared declassified 
summaries of evidence,” “testimony from prior trials and proceedings,”  “sworn [and even] 
unsworn written statements,” and “reports.” Id. § 6(D). See also Paust, Ad Hoc DoD Rules, supra 
note __, at 685-87. 
98  Verdicts issued by the military commissions may be appealed to specially established 
“Review Panels.” See DoD Order, supra note __, § 6(H)(4); see also LCHR, TRIALS UNDER 
MILITARY ORDER, supra note __, at 5-6 (criticizing the absence of a right to appeal guilty verdicts 
to a civilian court). 
99 See, e.g., MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 712 (1961) (“[A]cts committed in war by enemy civilians and members of 
armed forces may be punished as crimes under a belligerent’s municipal law only to the extent that 
such acts are violative of the international law on the conduct of hostilities. Clearly the rule of 
warfare should be pointless...if every single act of war may by unilateral municipal fiat be made a 
common crime and every prisoner of war executed as a murderer. International law delineates the 
outer limits of the liability of supposed war criminals; and conformity with that law affords a 
complete defense for the violent acts charged.”); U.S. DEP’T NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO 
THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 9 (Rev. A), FM 1-10, at 5-9 & n.9, 
11-14 & n.43 (1989) (“The Convention’s [GPW] underlying philosophy is that POWs should not 
be punished merely for having engaged in armed conflict....” “Prisoners of war may not be 
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offenses only if his actions (1) rise to the level of a “war crime”100 or “crime 
against humanity;”101 or (2) are unrelated to the state of hostilities (i.e., are 
common crimes).102 Properly understood, the scope of combatant immunity 
therefore underscores its relative insignificance on the policy front. Consider that 
acts of terrorism in the context of an armed conflict are always war crimes103—as 
are all attacks directed against the civilian population as such.104 In addition, 
violations of the rule of distinction are also war crimes105—as are acts of 
perfidy.106 The upshot is that there are no protective consequences associated with 
POW status for persons who have engaged in terrorism, attacked civilians, or 
committed warlike acts without adequately distinguishing themselves from 
                                                                                                                                                       
punished for hostile acts directed against opposing forces prior to capture, unless those acts 
constituted violations of the law of armed conflict.”).  
100 Even if convicted for pre-capture offenses, enemy combatants retain the benefits of 
the POW regime of GPW according to Article 85 of that treaty: “Prisoners of war prosecuted 
under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if 
convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.”  Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 
85. 
101 See ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note ___ (Commentary to Article 82 identifies 
“crimes against humanity” as a crime that pierces combatant immunity). 
102 See generally ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra, at 413-423 (setting forth rule).  See, 
e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp 1506, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff’d, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1060 (1998) (prosecuting prisoner of war for drug trafficking). 
Therefore, the immunity does not shield from prosecution enemy combatants charged with pre-
capture terrorist offenses not related to the conflict.  
103 See, e.g., Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, “Terrorism,” and International 
Humanitarian Law, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 547 (2002) (cataloguing various war crimes 
provisions implicated by acts of terrorism). Consider that such acts typically violate several 
provisions of Geneva law including: (1) the prohibition on attacks of civilians and civilian objects, 
AP I, supra note ___, arts. 51, 52; (2) the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, AP I, supra note 
___, art. 51; (3) the murder of persons no longer taking active part in hostilities, Geneva 
Conventions, supra note ___, common art. 3; AP I supra note ___, art. 75; and (4) the murder of 
persons “protected” by the Conventions. See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, art. 
146 (“grave breach” provision of Civilians Convention). Moreover, acts of terrorism are now 
expressly identified as “war crimes” in AP I and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda. See AP I, supra note ___, art. 51 (2) (“Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose 
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”); Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed 
in the Territory of Neighbouring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, S.C. 
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 4 (d) 
(criminalizing “acts of terrorism”).  
104 See AP I, supra note ___, arts. 51 (2), 52 (1). 
105 See, e.g., AP I, supra note ___, art. 45 (1) (requiring combatants to distinguish 
themselves from civilian population). 
106 See, e.g., AP I, supra note ___, arts. 37-39. 
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civilians. Moreover, POWs, even if immune from criminal prosecution, may be 
deprived of their liberty because of their participation in the hostilities.107 That is, 
all enemy combatants, even if POWs, may be detained without criminal charge 
for the duration of the hostilities.  
In short, the policy and protective consequences of combatant immunity 
are minimal. Combatant immunity, properly defined, confers protection on one 
important category of fighters: unlawful combatants who have otherwise 
complied with the law of war. These fighters—if denied POW status and 
therefore denied combatant immunity—may be prosecuted upon capture for their 
very participation in the hostilities. A compete defense of protective parity must 
demonstrate that all combatants should enjoy this immunity. In the balance of this 
Section, I take up this task. 
 
There are sound policy reasons to accord all captured combatants 
immunity for their otherwise lawful warlike acts. Combatant immunity—given its 
contours as just described—could and should be used as a tool to promote 
compliance with the rules of war.  If all captured combatants failing to satisfy the 
requirements for POW status are subject to prosecution for any warlike acts, then 
these fighters have no incentive to comply with the law of war in the conduct of 
hostilities. Although their very failure to satisfy POW status requirements 
suggests some conduct contrary to the laws of war, this conduct, in many 
instances, may not reflect any individual culpability. Recall that POW status turns 
on collective considerations.108 In this sense, the rules are directed primarily to the 
high command and other policymakers. For example, it is inopposite to 
characterize as “criminal” (as a formal or sociological matter) the otherwise 
lawful warlike acts of: (1) civilians who take up arms to defend their country 
against an enemy to whom they owe no allegiance;109 (2) soldiers fighting for a 
state that, as a matter of policy, does not issue uniforms satisfying the POW rules; 
                                                        
107 Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 21-22. 
108 See id. art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40. 
109 In some circumstances, such civilians are indeed entitled to POW status—irrespective of 
whether they are “regularized.” See GPW, supra note __, art. 4 (a)(6) (according POW status to all 
“[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take 
up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular 
armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.”). The 
scope of this provision, however, is unclear because the spontaneity and “insufficient time to 
organize” elements are ambiguous. See ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note ___, at 67- 68. The 
more broadly the provision is read, the more closely Geneva law more approximates protective 
parity. The important point is that these requirements only loosely track individual culpability. In 
addition, the very fact that these so-called levées en masse are accorded POW status suggests that, 
as a structural matter, Geneva law seeks to protect combatants who fight in a way that exhibits no 
culpability—even if this protection may compromise the principle of distinction.  
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or (3) soldiers fighting for a state that, as a general matter, has not complied with 
the rules of war. In addition, “unlawful” belligerency, fighting without satisfying 
the requirements for POW status, does not in all circumstances threaten the 
civilian population—that is, not all acts of “unlawful” belligerency undermine the 
principle of distinction. This is obviously true in some circumstances—think of an 
irregular fighter (who is out of uniform perhaps) manning a tank, armored vehicle, 
or fighter aircraft. In such circumstances, the fighter’s status as a combatant is 
clear to the attacking forces of the enemy; and, as a consequence, the structural 
capacity of these attacking forces to distinguish between civilians and combatants 
is not compromised. Consider two more nuanced examples: (1) irregular fighters 
positioned on the battlefied so as to make clear to the enemy their belligerent 
status; and (2) irregular fighters embedded in regular armed forces clearly 
deployed in an aggressive posture. These examples suggest that the criminal 
character of belligerent acts will depend on the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of any such acts. In other words, some conduct that results in the 
denial of POW status suggests culpability; some does not.  
Protective parity provides the best approach to the problem. Captured 
combatants (irrespective of their status) should be subject to criminal prosecution 
only if they have committed acts that constitute war crimes. Conversely, if 
combatants do not engage in such acts, they should not be punished for their very 
participation in the conduct of war.  As I develop more fully below, this rule is 
poses no grave danger to the principle of distinction if we define as war crimes all 
acts of irregularization that, given the circumstances, threaten innocent 
civilians.110 Critics of the view advanced here might defend the criminalization of 
unlawful belligerency on the grounds that (1) the irregularization of warfare 
resulting from such acts (irrespective of whether they exhibit a culpable mental 
state) poses a grave and generalized threat to civilians; and (2) the criminal 
sanction of is necessary to deter such persons from taking up arms.111 Although 
plausible, this line of reasoning suffers from two structural defects. First, 
criminalization of belligerency creates perverse incentives for the unlawful 
combatants—because their very participation in the hostilities subjects them to 
criminal prosecution upon capture, they have no incentive to comply with the law 
of war. Protecting the victims of warfare, including civilians, might best be 
                                                        
110 This is, in general, the approach of Protocol I. See Protocol I, supra note __, art. 44 (3) (“In 
order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, 
combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are 
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.”). 
111 See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2004). Here I analyze whether the provision of combatant 
immunity to all fighters would subvert the “principle of distinction.” In the next Section, I address 
the more general claim that the denial of humanitarian protection to unlawful combatants 
incentivizes fighters to observe the “principle of distinction.” See infra Section III.C 
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achieved by maximizing the incentives of combatants (those who are engaged in 
the fight) to comply with the law of war. As discussed above, the criminalization 
of belligerency eschews this type of incentive structure in favor of one that seeks 
to discourage would-be fighters from taking up arms in the first place. Second, 
criminalization of belligerency does not substantially alter the incentive structure 
of civilians contemplating participation in hostilities. All would-be combatants 
have non-trivial reasons to refrain from any direct participation in the hostilities. 
Recall that “peaceful” civilians are immune from lawful attack; all combatants, on 
the other hand, may be made the object of attack. In addition, “peaceful” civilians 
may be detained only in a narrow range of circumstances; whereas all combatants, 
upon capture, may be detained for the duration of the hostilities. In short, the 
structure of Geneva law discourages civilian participation in armed conflict. This 
is not to say that civilians participate in hostilities at a low rate. The point is that 
would-be fighters take up arms only if they are willing to assume substantial risk 
to life and liberty. The pool of civilians otherwise willing to fight includes only 
those who value highly the benefits they expect to issue from participation in the 
fight. For these individuals, the criminalization of belligerency adds only a 
modest disincentive (if any) to join the fight.   
 
C. Protective Parity and the Principle of Distinction 
 
 
The Geneva Conventions protect unlawful combatants; and this protection 
very closely approximates that accorded POWs. At first blush, this outcome might 
seem normatively unattractive. After all, if POW status is irrelevant, then 
combatants (and states) arguably have no incentive to comply with the 
organizational requirements of the POW Convention. And, of course, such an 
incentive structure would risk unraveling the fabric of international humanitarian 
law by eroding the “rule of distinction.” In short, over-protection of unlawful 
combatants risks systematic under-protection of “innocent” civilians as a whole.  
 
Although there is much to recommend this line of argument, it is in the 
end predicated on a mistaken assumption about the relationship between 
protective status and conduct. That is, the humanitarian critique of protective 
parity assumes that protection is a carrot (and denial of protection, a stick) to 
induce law-abiding conduct in time of war. One could, perhaps, design a rational 
humanitarian regime around the principle that its protections should cover only 
those who comply with its substantive commands. That, however, is not an 
organizing principle of Geneva law. To the contrary, the scope, content, and 
trajectory of Geneva law clearly demonstrate that humanitarian protection is not 
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used as an incentive to comply with the laws of war. Indeed, the protective 
regimes of Geneva law expressly condition the authority of states to enforce its 
substantive rules. Consider that the penal repression regime of the 1949 
Conventions and Article 75 of AP I require states to accord all persons accused of 
violating the Conventions certain due process rights.112 In addition, the POW 
Convention makes clear that POWs do not lose their protective status even if 
convicted of the most serious war crimes.113 Nevertheless, this may only prove 
that Geneva law is incoherent and normatively suspect. In other words, these 
points do not address the deeper issue of whether “protective parity” is consistent 
with the principle of distinction. 
 
Assume that the organizational and behavioral prerequisites for POW 
status would, if observed, promote the rule of distinction—a questionable but 
useful assumption. The only question then is how best to encourage fighters to 
comply with these standards. An important point here is that, although Geneva 
law provides substantial protection to unlawful combatants, it nevertheless 
provides incentives for individuals to comply with its rules. As discussed more 
fully in Parts I and II, persons violating the laws of war face the prospect of 
criminal prosecution. Geneva law, in this sense, might be understood as exhibiting 
a two pronged strategy: (1) it protects all persons subject to the authority of a 
belligerent state (or armed opposition group) irrespective of their “status” (what I 
have called “protective parity”); and (2) it subjects all persons violating its 
substantive rules to criminal prosecution irrespective of their “status” (what I will 
call the “war crimes approach” to enforcement).  
 
                                                        
112 Compare these robust procedural rights with the minimal procedural protections 
accorded in status determination proceedings. See, e.g., GPW III, supra note ___, art. 5 (requiring 
only that “in the case of doubt”, status is determined by a “competent tribunal”). For a detailed 
analysis of Article 5, see Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT’L REV. RED 
CROSS 571 (2002). 
113 Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 85 (“Prisoners of war prosecuted under 
the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, 
the benefits of the present Convention.”). Although the provision references “the laws of the 
Detaining Power”—which might be understood as distinct from the “laws of war,” the drafting 
history, ICRC Commentary, and interpretation of leading military manuals make clear that it 
encompasses prosecution for “international” crimes. It is also important to note that the Civilians 
Convention does not have a direct analogue to Article 85. However, this provision was considered 
necessary in the Third Convention because of the conduct elements embedded in the definition of 
POWs. See id. art. 4 (A) (2). No such provision is required in the Civilians Convention because: 
(1) its definition of “protected persons” does not include any conduct elements; and (2) the Article 
5 derogation regime provides an exhaustive catalogue of protective consequences issuing from 
conduct. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, arts. 4, 5. 
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Of course, critics of protective parity might suggest that these two 
commitments are not so easily separated. These critics might point out that some 
rules defining status categories (such as the definition of POWs) are themselves 
also primary rules of conduct. After all, when an enemy combatant removes his 
uniform (donning only civilian clothing) and conceals his weapons, he has 
committed conduct that arguably both (1) deprives him upon capture of POW 
status; and (2) transgresses the rule of distinction (and perhaps the prohibition on 
perfidy)—hence, endangering innocent civilians. That is, the same conduct 
determines whether the combatant is a POW and whether he has committed a war 
crime. This contention, so framed, is both accurate and important—though not for 
the reason our critics might suppose. It is correct to say that the same conduct 
might have both status consequences and criminal consequences, but this only 
underscores the conceptual integrity of protective parity. Consider again the case 
of the hypothetical combatant fighting in civilian clothes with arms concealed. 
There are, as just described, two consequences: denial of POW status and 
prosecution for war crimes. Under the principle of protective parity, the first 
consequence has no protective implications The second consequence, as a formal 
matter, also has no protective implications. Throughout his confinement and any 
criminal proceedings (irrespective of the outcome), the fighter will enjoy the full 
protections of the Geneva law. On the other hand, our hypothetical fighter will 
face negative consequences—criminal punishment for his acts. Negative 
consequences issue from the fighter’s failure to comply with the laws of war, but 
the imposition of these negative consequences is itself governed by the protective 
schemes of Geneva law. The important point is that the scope and content of 
protective schemes are conceptually distinct from the scope and content of 
enforcement schemes. The former need not be inextricably connected to the later. 
The upshot is that protective parity need not erode the rule of distinction—
protection can coincide with the energetic suppression of war crimes. 
 
Moreover, there are good reasons to prefer from a deterrence perspective 
the prevailing approach in Geneva law. Recall that there are at least two ways to 
build into humanitarian regimes structural incentives to comply: (1) denial of 
humanitarian protection to bad actors (coupled perhaps with criminal 
prosecutions); or (2) criminal prosecution of bad actors (all of whom nevertheless 
enjoy humanitarian protection). Geneva law—preferring war crimes prosecutions 
over denial of humanitarian protection—is narrowly tailored to punish only bad 
actors. That is, the “war crimes” approach targets persons who, with a culpable 
mental state, have committed acts causing or risking grave consequences for 
protected persons. The “denial of protective status” approach, on the other hand, 
punishes an unacceptably broad range of conduct including all acts which would 
have the effect of depriving captured persons of protective status.  
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The “war crimes” approach is preferable because it emphasizes 
culpability. Not all conduct depriving persons of POW status may be classified as 
war crimes (and the inverse is obviously false—not all conduct constituting a war 
crime would deprive a combatant of POW status). Indeed, the overlap 
encompasses only conduct that threatens the humanitarian values of Geneva law. 
Two examples illustrate the point. First consider that several categories of persons 
accompanying the armed forces—including civilian members of military aircraft 
crews, war correspondents, and supply contractors—are entitled to POW status 
provided they have express authorization to do so and carry an identification card 
documenting this authorization.114 Any such persons captured in battle without 
proper identification or without express authorization may well be denied POW 
status—although this conduct arguably would not rise to the level of a war crime. 
In addition, individual members of a fighting force that systematically violates the 
laws of war may well be denied POW status—even if the individual fighter has 
not committed and is not complicit in any violations himself. 115 Loss of status, in 
short, cannot be equated with culpability. These examples demonstrate that the 
“war crimes” approach is a more exacting tool—directing punitive action toward 
culpable persons.  
 
The “war crimes” approach also corrects some perverse incentives created 
by the “denial of protection” approach. Note first that the example of the law-
abiding fighter in the law-disregarding fighting force (described in the previous 
paragraph) illustrates this point. Under the “war crimes” approach, the fighter has 
some incentive to obey the laws of war, whereas the “denial of protection” 
approach assures that he will suffer punitive measures at the hands of the enemy 
irrespective of his personal conduct. Moreover, the “denial of protection” 
approach might lengthen and intensify conflicts by providing a disincentive to 
surrender. As discussed above, military planners and soldiers have long 
understood that poor treatment of captured enemy fighters often backfires because 
it encourages the enemy to “fight to the death.”116 The important point here is that 
the same logic applies to the conduct of all combatants—whether they satisfy the 
requirements of POW status or not. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                                                        
114 See Geneva Convention III, supra note __, art. 4 (A) (4). 
115 See id. art. 4 (A) (2) (d). 
116 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note ___, at ; FLORY, 
supra note ___, at ___  (documenting history).  
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 Humanitarian protection in time of war should not vary by detainee status 
category. Through an analysis of the legal situation of unlawful combatants, I 
illustrate that (1) protective schemes are converging; and (2) although the 
protective significance of POW status is declining, there are some persistent gaps 
in coverage. Building on this descriptive base, I provide a comprehensive 
normative defense of protective parity. The unique protective significance of 
POW status suggests that POWs are systematically, though only modestly, over-
protected and unlawful combatants are systematically under-protected. If 
protective schemes compromise legitimate security interests, POWs are 
systematically over-protected. That is, these security-based claims, if valid, would 
apply irrespective of whether the detainees were properly classified as POWs or 
not. If humane treatment of the enemy increases battlefield effectiveness (because 
poor treatment discourages surrender, encourages reprisals, decreases troop 
morale, and decreases political support for the war effort), then unlawful 
combatants are systematically under-protected. I also argue that protective parity 
is consistent with the principle of distinction. Even if “irregularization” 
undermines distinction, the question is how best to encourage fighters to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. I maintain that protective 
status categories are an inefficient way to incentivize individual combatants 
because these categories necessarily trade on collective considerations—such as 
the organizational characteristics of the fighting force. The rule of distinction 
would be better served by an individualized “war crimes” approach that accorded 
all fighters substantial humanitarian protection and punished (in accord with basic 
requirements of due process) individual bad actors.  
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